Introduction
Islamic law provides numerous remedies to a Muslim wife in cases where harm (ḍarar) to her has been established to the satisfaction of a judge. In the subcontinent, under section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 ('DMMA'), a Muslim woman can obtain a divorce in case of her husband's disappearance for four years, her non-maintenance for two years, imprisonment of the husband for seven years or more, failure of the husband to perform his marital obligations for a period of three years, the husband's impotence, his insanity, and her maltreatment by the husband.
1 However, these grounds do not seem to have brought any positive change to the affected women in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The primary reason for this is that grounds for divorce available under the DMMA are fault based. The complainant wife has to prove the offence. Matrimonial offences such as ill treatment and cruelty by the husband or his family are hard to prove, because such offences take place within the privacy of homes and those accused of wrongdoing tend not to testify for the women. For these reasons, a no-fault based remedy was badly needed in the subcontinent and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Khul' seems to provide an answer, but the issues surrounding khul' in Islamic law are complicated, as shall be explained below. As far as the judiciary is concerned the Lahore High Court ruled for the first time in the Balqis Fatima case in 1959, 2 that khul' should be available to a woman as of right and without the consent of the husband. This position was endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Khurshid Bibi case of 1967. 3 In Egypt, Law No. 1 of 2000 did exactly the same as was done by the Superior Judiciary in Pakistan.
This article gives special attention to the opinions of Mālikī exegetes and jurists in their interpretation of verse 4:35 of the Qur'ān. It examines the Ḥabība's episode 4 and asks whether it has precedential value. Furthermore, it evaluates the arguments of fuqahā' of various schools of thought regarding the issue of (in)validity of khul' without the consent of the husband and examines the Islamic nature of legislation on khul' in Pakistan as well as in Egypt. In terms of methodology, the opinions of Muslim exegetes are discussed in Part I, followed by an analysis of the Ḥabība's ḥadith in Part II. This is followed by an analysis of the opinions of Muslim jurists of various schools of thought and the reasons for their respective positions in Part III. Part IV evaluates selected decisions of high courts and the Supreme Court of Pakistan on khul' and asks whether these amount to judicial ijtihād. Part V discusses the Islamicity of section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 as amended in 2002. Part VI evaluates the views of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and asks whether the CII has exceeded its mandate. Finally, Part VII provides a conclusion.
PART I: Khul' and the Qur'ān
While discussing khul', fuqahā' and commentators of the Qur'ān refer to the Qur'ānic verse 2:229, which states:
Divorce can be pronounced twice: then, either honourable retention or kindly release should follow. (While dissolving the marriage tie) it is unlawful for you to take back anything of what you have given to your wives unless both fear that they may not be able to keep within the bounds set by Allah. Then, if they fear that they might not be able to keep within the bounds set by Allah, there is no blame upon them for what the wife might give away of her property to become released from the marriage tie.
The crucial question on which exegetes differ concerns who is being addressed in the verse through the use of the term 'fa in khiftum': Is it addressed to the Ḥukkām (state authority), which is represented by the courts, or is it addressed to both the partners? In other words, who will determine whether the two partners can or cannot live within the bounds set by God? Should the determination of that important point be the responsibility of a court, acting on behalf of the state, or should it be determined by the partners themselves? Moreover, what constitutes 'khawf' (fear), mentioned in the verse? According to Imām al-Shāfi'ī, 'when one of them cannot keep within the bounds set by God, so both [are considered] unable to keep within the bounds of God.' 11 According to Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, 'illa un yakhāfā' means 'if both of them thought'. 12 The fear that the 'two may not be able to keep within the bounds set by God', arises when either of them violates their marital duties 13 and/or transgresses upon mutual rights, or the rights of one or both of the partners are denied. The Qur'ānic verse provides, 'Women have the same rights against their men as men have against them.' 14 'Ali b. Abī Ṭālib (May Allah be pleased with him) is reported to have said, '[There are three] phrases when uttered by the wife [to the obtains khul' after consummation of marriage, and 'al-muftadiyatu' is to redeem herself by paying some of her money, however, these terms are used interchangeably. ' man], it becomes legal for him to take 'al-fidya' (the compensation): When she tells him that I will not obey you, that I will not fulfil your promise on oath, and I will not purify myself after sexual intercourse with you.' 15 It is reported from 'Abdullah b. 'Abbās that 'her omission to keep within the bounds set by God is [treated as] disdain for the husband and a bad nature on her part.'
16 Jaṣṣāṣ has mentioned the full statement of Ibn 'Abbās as: Thus, if she says, "I swear by God [that] I will not fulfill your oath, and I will not agree to your request of sleeping with you in the bed, and I will not obey you. If she did this, it is allowed for him to take from her 'al-fidya' but he should not take more than what he gave her (i.e., the dower) and let her go [provided] she caused the harm." Then, he [Ibn 'Abbās] recited, "but if they, of their accord, give up unto you aught thereof, then enjoy it with pleasure and good cheer," (4:4) and it is said, that when there is no harm or cheating [in obtaining it], then it is pleasure and good cheer as God described it.
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Qurtubī mentions that according to 'Attā b. Abī Rabāḥ, 'Khul' and taking (compensation for the husband) become legal when the woman says to her husband: I hate you and do not like you or something similar.'
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Muḥammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974) argues that the situation in which both the partners cannot keep within the bounds set by God, arises in two ways: first, if the woman is nāshizah (violates her marital duties), disobedient, or coerced, such as the wife of Thābit b. Qays b. Shamas Al-Anṣārī (d. 11/632); second, when the man has a problem such that marital life with him is not possible anymore. 19 Qurtubī argues that 'the majority of jurists are of the opinion that the addressees in the words of the Exalted 'wa in khiftum' (And if you fear) 20 22 Abū Zahra argues that the addressees are either 'the group of Muslims because they cooperate with each other, as they got discord between the spouses, or it is to the group of women and men', and his preference is for the first meaning. 23 Jurists differ in their opinions on the matter of whether khul' ought to be adjudicated or not; a topic which will be elaborated upon later when the various schools of thought come under discussion. In Pakistan, the Lahore High Court accepted the interpretation that the 'you' in the phrase 'if you fear' must be addressed to the state and the judicial officers of the state in the Balqis Fatima case. It clearly was not addressed to the two spouses, who are in this section referred to in the third person as 'they' and 'them.' 24 Exegetes from the Mālikī school of thought discuss khul' under verse 4:35 which reads, 'If you fear a breach between the two, appoint an arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator from her people. If they both want to set things right, Allah will bring about reconciliation between them. Allah knows all, is well aware of everything.' Qurtubī argues that 'the arbitrators chosen by the state authority should see who is the cause of discord and once this is established they should dissolve the marriage through khul'.' 25 He further asserts that one arbitrator should be from the man's side and one from the woman's side because they know their problems better. However, 'if there is no one from the spouses' people who could be appointed as arbitrators, so other suitable persons may be appointed by the state authority.' 26 He argues that the arbitrators should remind the spouses about their union, so that they agree to remain together as husband and wife. And if they refuse to live as husband and wife and 'the arbitrators consider [sic] it appropriate to decree separation they 21 Ibn 'Ashur argues that verse 4:35 makes it obligatory to appoint arbitrators in case of a continuing dispute between the spouses which is denoted as 'shiqāq' (breach or discord). Apparently the appointing authority is the ruler and state authority, and not the spouses because the verb 'ib'athu' (appoint) is not addressed to the spouses. If they are appointed by the spouses, then the word 'al-ba'th' would have no meaning in the verse. 28 He asserts that '[w]hatever decree is issued by the arbitrators is binding whether it be separation or union or khul'. And there is no say for the spouses in it because this is what arbitration is meant for.'
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In a nutshell, the Qur'ānic concept of khul' is: first, either of the partners may initiate it if he or she thinks that marital rights cannot be upheld in the marriage. Second, according to the preferred opinion of the majority of exegetes, the court has to determine the extent of discord, harm, aversion, coercion, etc. Third, and this is very crucial, the court must ascertain whether it can grant khul', especially when the discord or harm is attributed to the woman and she is ready to pay compensation to her husband without the husband's consent, or is it conditional upon the consent of the husband? In other words, is khul' a consensual act or can the court put an end to the marriage by khul' without the husband's consent? The answer is not clear from the wording of the Qur'ān in verse 2:229 and this is why exegetes had to resort to aḥādīth regarding khul'. Fourth, Mālikī jurists also discuss khul' under the Qur'ānic verse 4:35 and conclude that khul' can be affected by the arbitrators and their decision shall be binding without the consent of the husband and the wife. Fifth, in case khul' is consensual (or even if it is not consensual or the consent of the husband is not required), then the court may put an end to the marriage and ask the wife to return the dower or what is agreed upon by both the partners as compensation for her freedom. Finally, there is no sin on the part of the spouses to receive such compensation. The apparent language of the verse 2:229 indicates that it is the wife who has to pay compensation to free herself, 'fima'fdatbehi' (what the wife may give up [to her husband]). 30 To answer the remaining questions, we have to resort to aḥādīth of the Prophet (peace be upon him). In the second and third versions of the same incident, the Prophet (peace be upon him) is reported to have ordered Thābit ('amarahu) to divorce her in return for his garden.
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In the first version in Al-Bukhārī, the words 'iqbil' (accept) and 'ṭalliqhā' (divorce her) are used in the imperative form by the Prophet, but in the second one the indirect speech is very clear that Thābit's approval was not sought but the Prophet had ordered him. According to the report of Imām Al-Nasā'ī: Thābit b. Qays b. Shamas hit his wife and broke her limb and she was Jamīla bint 'Abdullah b. Uby. She complained to her brother who took her to the Prophet (peace be upon him) and the Prophet (peace be upon him) summoned Thābit and told him, "take (khudh) [ 'A'isha (the Prophet's wife) relates that Ḥabība bint Sahl was married to Thābit b. Qays b. Shamas, who hit her and broke a limb of hers. She approached the Prophet (peace be upon him) after dawn, and he summoned Thābit and told him: "Take (khudh) some of her money and separate from her." Thābit said: "Is this permissible, Prophet of God?" The Prophet said: "Yes." Thābit: "I gave her two gardens as dower and they are her property." The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Take them and separate from her (fariqha)", which he did.
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Ibn Māja, in his collection of aḥādīth, narrates on the authority of Ibn 'Abbās that this case is similar to Al-Bukhārī's first version of the case, with the difference that the Prophet (peace be upon him) 'has ordered Thābit to take only the garden and not more (than the garden).' O, by Allah, were I not to fear God, I would spit in his face whenever he touches me." The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Would you give him back his garden?" She said: "Yes", and she gave it back. Then the Prophet (peace be upon him) separated them (farraqa baynahumā). . Ibn Ḥanbal comments on this ḥadith that 'It was the first khul' in Islām.' Thābit's wife in the report surveyed is referred to as Ḥabība or Jamila, while in other reports she is simply Thābit's wife. Al-Bukhārī mentioned her as Thābit's wife in two narrations but in one report her name was mentioned as Jamīla. Ibn Ḥanbal, Abū Dāwūd, and Imām Mālik in his Muwaṭṭā, mention her name as Ḥabība, whereas Ibn Māja and Al-Nasā'i mention her name as Jamila. The Superior Courts in Pakistan,
In the report of Ibn Māja, as well as Abū Dāwud, Thābit -the husband -does not play any decisive role (as assigned to him by the legists) as the Prophet never asked for his consent for the separation. The crux of the matter is that according to the above reports, which are different versions of the same incident, khul' is not consensual and the consent of the husband is not essential. As will be explained below, however, the majority of fuqahā' of Ḥanafī, Shāfi'ī, Ḥanbalī as well Shī'a schools of thought purport that khul' cannot be granted by the court without the consent of the husband. The four compilers of aḥādīth collections who narrate Ḥabība's episode 'neither mention nor allude to her husband's approval as a condition for her divorce; on the contrary, what they all have in common is the command aspect of the Prophet's order to Thābit to take the compensation and separate from Ḥabība.' 37 Despite this 'imposed' passivity on the part of Thābit, the majority jurists have unanimously assigned a decisive role to the husband in khul'. According to Jaṣṣāṣ of the Ḥanafī school, the fact that both Thābit and Ḥabība were asked by the Prophet (peace be upon him) implies that khul' is consensual because the husband has been placed at the center point in this episode, otherwise the Prophet could have dismissed him completely and divorced Ḥabība entirely on his own. 38 The conclusion that can be derived from this narrative is that the majority of legists differ from the ḥadīth, and to some extent from the Qur'ān, regarding khul', especially regarding the approval of the husband. There is no doubt that the Qur'ānic verse was further explained by the Ḥabība's episode and that the Prophet's ruling has precedential value. Oussama argues that Muslim legists seem to allow the Qur'ānic implication of a consensual transaction to overrule the Prophetic ruling in the Ḥabība's khul' separation case. 39 However, Mālikī jurists differ from most Sunnī scholars on the issue of the consent of the husband. In addition, as explained above, there is no unanimity on the issue that the Qur'ānic verse 2:229 only allowed a consensual bargaining-based negotiated settlement as some exegetes have expressly mentioned that the word 'tum' (you) is addressed to the state authority. The Ḥabība incident stands on its own and has not been overruled by the Qur'ān. Moreover, one has to analyse the opinions of jurists regarding verse 4:35 to reach a clear conclusion.
throughout their discussion regarding the khul's incident, referred to her as Jamila and, in some cases, the Courts mentioned that Thābit b. Qays had two wives. In this work the name, Ḥabība, has been used while referring to Thābit's wife. 37 Arabi, The Dawning of New Millennium, 17. 38 Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur'ān 1:539. 39 Arabi, The Dawning of New Millennium, 17.
It is this precedent that provided the basis for the new law of khul' in Pakistan, as well as in Egypt.
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Part III: Khul' in Fiqh Literature
Khul' in the Ḥanafī School
Ḥanafī jurists fully acknowledge the ḥadīth of Ḥabība but unanimously assign the husband a decisive and controlling role in the process of khul'. Jassas points out that the fact that the Prophet had sought the opinions of both Ḥabība and Thābit, places the latter at the centre stage of the debate since the Prophet could have dismissed him completely and granted a divorce to Ḥabība himself. 41 Ḥanafī jurists insist that the consent of the husband is necessary for the validity of khul'. Abū Bakr alSarakhsi argues that khul' 'is a transaction that requires the consent of the [parties] like all other transactions.'
42 Kāsānī states that the basic element of khul' is 'offer and acceptance because it is ṭalāq for compensation, thus, there cannot be any separation without acceptance.' 43 In other words, for Kāsānī, a court cannot force anyone to enter into contractual relations, and therefore, it cannot grant khul' without the husband's consent. There is no disagreement among Ḥanafī jurists on this issue, 44 40 The Egyptian Law No. 1 of 2000 declared that a married couple may mutually agree to separation (khul'); however, if they do not agree and the wife sues demanding it, and separates herself from her husband by forfeiting all her financial legal rights, and returns to him the dower he gave to her, then the court is to divorce her from him. 14. However, the court does not decree divorce (ṭaṭlīq) via khul' except after attempting reconciliation between the married couple, and after appointing two mediators to attempt conciliation between them for a period that may not exceed three months, … and after a wife decides explicitly that she abhors living with her husband and there is no way to continue the married life between them, and that she is also afraid of transgressing the bounds set by God, because of this discord. The separation affected under Article 20 is an irrevocable divorce (ṭalāq bā'in); and the court's decision is, under all circumstances, not subject to appeal in any of the form and in any forum. At p. 15. 45 and agree that adjudication is not necessary for affecting it as it can be concluded outside the court. 46 According to Abū Ḥanīfa, a man cannot retract his offer should he initiate khul', as he is governed by the rules of oaths; he has to wait for his wife to accept or reject his offer. She has to submit to the rules of compensation and is allowed to retract her offer before his response. Abū Ḥanīfa bases his reasoning on the principle that khul' is bay' (sale transaction) on the part of the wife, as she is buying back control over herself. 47 If the discord emanates from the husband, 'then it is not permissible for him to take any compensation in return for khul'.' 48 The apparent wording of the Qur'ān presumes that the woman pays compensation to free herself (fimaaftadat behi), so the discord is always assumed to be because of her. Kāsānī argues that:
If the matter is resolved by a stranger, then he is allowed to order [ Thus, Kāsānī -referred to as the king of 'ulamā' (malak al-'ulamā) within the Ḥanafī school of thought -considers the consent of the husband necessary even if the amount of compensation to be given to him is less than the amount of dower. In other words, the husband according to the Ḥanafī school of thought, seems to have the equivalent of a veto regarding ṭalāq and khul'. 45 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur'ān 1:538; Al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-mabsūṭ 6:168; Kāsānī, Badā'i' 3:228. Kāsānī argues that khul'is 'a single irrevocable ṭalāq because it is divorce by using metaphorical words which is irrevocable in our school and because it is divorce for compensation (ṭalāqbi al-'iwad) and when the man accepted the compensation it is necessary that she should own herself as a result of paying compensation and she cannot redeem herself without irrevocable ṭalāq therefore it (khul') is irrevocable ṭalāq'. At 228. 46 Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur'ān 1:539; Al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-mabsūṭ 6:168-69; Kāsānī, Badā'i' 3:229. Kāsānī mentions that only al-Ḥasan and Ibn Sīrīn argue that khul' can be affected without the Sulṭān (state-authorized court). 47 Al-Zayla'i, Tabyin 3:182; Kāsānī, Badā'i', 3:228. 48 Kāsānī, Badā'i', 3:235. 49 Ibid. According to Margīnānī, 'If the discord is because of her, we consider it disapproved that he takes from her more than he had given her.' However, 'If he takes back in excess (of what he gave her) it is valid for the purposes of adjudication. Likewise If he takes more when the discord is due to him.' Margīnānī, Al-Hidāya, 2:30.
Khul' in the Mālikī School
The linguistic formulations of the Mālikī jurists on khul' are not easy to understand and need an in-depth analysis to reach a clear conclusion on whether the consent of the husband is necessary for khul'. The confusion is mainly whether the Mālikīs consider the consent of the husband a legal necessity by implication or not. Imām Mālik has discussed the Qur'ānic verse 4:35, Ḥabība's ruling, and two cases involving neglectful husbands, and his legal formulations suggest that he gives the two arbitrators the main role in the dissolution of marriage, either by ṭalāq or khul'. In addition, he also presumes a negotiated settlement. 50 Certain points within the Mālikī school are clear and these are mentioned below.
In circumstances where it is difficult for a woman to live with her husband and she approaches the court, it must be clear that which one of the two is the cause of discord. When it is known to the court that the husband or the wife has caused the discord, the court shall attempt to bring about reconciliation. If this is not possible, then the court may dissolve the marriage. 51 The court shall order khul' if it finds that the husband was the cause of the discord. In this situation, the wife will be ordered to return the dower given to her by the husband. However, if it comes to the conclusion that the wife was the cause of the discord, it shall dissolve the marriage by divorce and shall order the husband to pay the dower if not yet paid. The court under the Mālikī school can issue a decree of ṭalāq or khul' without the consent of the husband and wife. 52 If the court does not know which one of the two is to blame for the dispute, it has to appoint two arbitrators: one to represent each the husband and the wife. Mālikī jurists have elaborated on the role assigned to the arbitrators. 53 In general, they agree that the arbitrators may dissolve the marriage either by ṭalāq or khul' depending upon who is to blame for the dispute. Some Mālikī jurists have even stated that the court or the arbitrators can dissolve the marriage through ṭalāq or khul' without the consent of both the husband and the wife. This is evident from many classical Mālikī texts (mutūn), as well as commentaries on the main texts. While commenting on Qur'ānic verse 4:35, which reads 'If you fear a breach between the two, appoint an arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator from her people. If they both want to set Allah has mentioned what to do with a disobedient wife and how to deal with an obedient one, then he mentioned another situation, that is, when there is discord between the two which they cannot reconcile themselves and it is not known who caused it. So [in this situation the court] should appoint two Muslim arbitrators to investigate the matter between the two. And their decision has to be implemented whether it is the dissolution of marriage through ṭalāq or khul' without the consent of the husband.
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Ibn 'Abdul Bar -another leading Mālikī jurist -has said something similar. He argues:
The spouses may appoint one arbitrator each without the intervention of the State authority. If the husband is the cause of discord they shall dissolve the marriage without anything. The arbitrators should not take anything from the wife [in this situation] with the condition that she is divorced [by the husband]. And it is said that it is allowed [to take something from the wife in this situation]; and if she was the cause of discord, they [the arbitrators] should take [money or compensation] from her as they think appropriate and it [the resultant separation] will be khul' and the two should be separated [their marriage be dissolved].
55
Mālikī jurists have also explained the situation in which both the husband and the wife are equally blameworthy for the discord. According to 'Abdarī, 'the husband shall not be given anything if both the husband and the wife were equally guilty of discord.' 56 Imām Mālik discusses three different versions of Ḥabība's case and seems to introduce the husband's consent in the third version, in which the Prophet (peace be upon him) invited Thābit and told him about his wife and about her willingness to return him the garden to which Thābit said: 'This is to my liking; Yes. ' when he pressurises a woman, while a woman possesses khul' when she wants to pressurise a man (her husband).' 60 It can be construed from this passage that Ibn Rushd treats khul' as a right possessed by a woman that is the equivalent of a man's right to divorce and that khul' is not dependent upon the consent of the husband. This passage is not clear about Ibn Rushd's opinion or the opinion of Mālikī school on the issue of consent of the husband. However, mentioning the crucial role of arbitrators, Ibn Rushd says:
They [the jurists] disputed the agreed decision of the arbiters to separate them [the husband and wife], whether it would require the consent of the husband. Mālik and his disciples said that their decision about separation and union is valid without specific delegation by the spouses and without their consent. Al-Shāfi'ī, Abū Ḥanīfah and their disciples said that they have no right to separate them, except when the husband delegates such authority to them.
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Taqīuddīn al-Ḥilālī, a leading 20 th century Mālikī scholar argues:
Jurists differ regarding the issue of arbitrators; are they appointed by the state authority so that their ruling is binding without the consent of the spouses or are they proxies for the spouses? There are two opinions regarding this issue: the majority of scholars prefer the first opinion [i.e. their ruling is binding without the consent of the spouses] because of the Qur'ānic verse, 'appoint an arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator from her people', so they are named as 'hakamayn' (arbitrators) and an arbitrator is allowed to rule without the consent of the disputant and this is the apparent meaning of the Qur'ānic verse [4:35].
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It is very clear from the above that Mālikī jurists have given a crucial role to arbitrators and they may decide to dissolve the marriage by khul' without the consent of the husband as well as the wife. In addition, Mālikī jurists consider khul' as ṭalāq. 63 As far as the amount of compensation is concerned, Ibn Rushd argues that according to Imām Mālik and a group of jurists, 'it is permitted to a woman to secure freedom with more than what has come to her from the husband, by way of dower.' Dāwūd, and Al-Dār Quṭnī, and derives various rules pertaining to khul'. He argues that khul' is legal as stated in the Qur'ān in verse 2:229, and that the verse allows it with or without the permission of the sulṭān (state authority). The verse indicates that the resultant separation will be an irrevocable ṭalāq because God has named it 'fidya (ransom) and if the (separation) would be revocable, as thought by some people, there would be no ransoming for the woman after paying him.' 71 The Qur'ānic verse 'fa lā junāhā 'alīhīmā fīmā aftadat bihi' (there shall be no sin upon either of them for what the wife may give up [to her husband] in order to free herself), 'also indicates that taking more or less (than the amount of the dower) is allowed and that he can take more than what he gave her.' Ibn al-Qaiyam produces a ruling given by 'Uthmān b. 'Affān (d. 35/656) in which a woman paid as her khul' settlement everything she owned and 'Uthmān ordered the husband to take even her hair-band ('Iqās), 72 and that 'Umar b. Al-Khaṭṭāb was reported by a man whose wife had violated her marital duties (nāshīza) and 'Umar said (to him): 'separate from her (ikhla'ha) even if she gives (you) her earrings (qirat) [ He goes on to say that a woman cannot be forced to free herself. ' [A]nd the consent of both (the husband and wife) is essential for its legality (i.e., khul'). And if it (i.e., khul') was affected without these two conditions (i.e., compensation from the wife and the consent of the husband), then it is invalid.' 77 similar to a sale or a marriage contract, it does not require a judge, and also because it is a dissolution of contract by mutual consent (qaṭ' 'aqd bi al tarāḍī). ' The Ahl al-Ḥadīth in Pakistan also allow khul' if the wife abhors the man and has a natural hatred for him. 'Abdullah Roprī produces two versions of Ḥabība's case and concludes that mere aversion or abhorrence is enough for a woman to obtain khul'. 78 Although, Roprī does not explicitly mention whether the consent of the husband is necessary for khul', he advises that 'in such a situation the wife has the option of dissolving her marriage (faskh e nikāḥ) through 'Panchayat', etc.' 79 
Khul' in the Shī'a school
According to Ḥillī of the Ithna 'asharīa (twelver) Shī'a school of thought, the specific words used for khul' are: when the husband says, 'you are redeemed for so much (khala'tuki 'alā al-kazā).' 80 Khul' is also allowed if the husband used the word khul' only without mentioning the word ṭalāq. But according to another opinion, the word khul' must be followed by the word ṭalāq to be valid. 81 Khul' is defined by the editor of Ḥillī's book as '[p]utting an end to marriage when the woman abhors her husband only in return for compensation from the woman. ' 82 This means that if she abhors him she has to make an offer, which may be accepted or rejected by the husband. This makes the consent of the husband mandatory. The preferred view is that separation through this way is irrevocable ṭalāq and not faskh. 'If they agreed on khul', then the husband cannot retract but she can retract in paying fidya during her 'iddat' (waiting period) and he can retract if she offers to do it.' 83 After discussing the opinions of the fuqahā' belonging to the various schools of thought, the picture that emerges is as follows: 1) all of the schools of thought permit khul' and cite verse 2:229 84 and Ḥabība's incident; 2) according to the Mālikī school, if the husband is the cause of the discord then he should not take or be given any compensation, but if the wife is the cause of the discord then she must pay compensation to the husband; 3) all the fuqahā' agree that the resultant separation 78 'Abdullah Roprī, Fatawa Ahl al-Ḥadīth (Muhammad Siddique ed, Idāra Ihyā' al-Sunna alNabawiya n.d.) 2:523. 79 Ibid 2:522. Roprī has described such a separation as 'faskh e nikāḥ' (at 2:522) and 'khul'' (at 2:523). Panchayat is a council of elders in villages of Punjab in Pakistan and India for settling local civil disputes. 80 Thus it is the husband who has to say it. 81 Najmuddīn al-Muhaqiq al-Ḥillī, Shar'ā'i al-Islām (Al-Syad Ṣādiq Al-Shīrāzī ed, Dār al-Qārī 2004) 2:42. 82 Ibid, fn 1. 83 Ibid, 2:49. 84 The Mālikīs also cite verse 4:35 of the Qur'ān as discussed above.
will be irrevocable, that is, a ṭalāq; 85 4) the compensation to be paid may be the equivalent of, or more or less, than the amount of dower; 5) if they settled on more than what he gave her, it is morally reprehensible but legally binding; 6) the majority of schools disregard the ruling in Ḥabība's case and require the consent of the husband for khul', however, the Mālikī jurists have reached a different conclusion based on verse 4:35 by allowing the arbitrators authority to put an end to marriage without the consent of the husband, even if the spouses have not delegated them the authority to do so; 7) the majority agree that khul' is consensual and the consent of both spouses is necessary, whereas the Mālikīs allow the arbitrators to dissolve the marriage by khul' without the consent of the husband or wife; 8) khul' can be settled between the partners with or without the intervention of state authority; 9) fuqahā' of all Sunnī schools have referred to the Prophet's ruling in the case of Ḥabība, in which in some narrations, the Prophet prohibited her from paying more than her dower but they (fuqahā') consider paying more by the wife to be legally permissible.
The majority of jurists grant the husband an absolute right at the expense of his wife because of the notion of qawāma. 86 However, resort to a court in case of khul' seems unavoidable and the court must have a role to determine the issue of harm to the wife or hatred between the two parties in addition to determining the amount and extent of compensation. If a husband claims that they can live within the boundaries fixed by Allah but the wife says that they cannot, then whose claim should be accepted? It would require a third person to determine whether the wife cannot live with the husband and whether the level of hatred and aversion has reached the point of no return (irrevocable breakdown of marriage).
Part IV: Khul' and the Superior Courts in Pakistan: Interpreting Islamic Law or Judicial Ijtihād?

The Traditional View
The earliest reported case on khul' in the subcontinent-now India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, is that of Munshi Buzul-ul-Raheem case, 87 in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled that khul' was not available without the consent of the husband under Islamic law. Unfortunately, this case is applicable in 85 Ṭalāq in which revocation is allowed but the couple can remarry with a fresh nikāḥ without the wife's intervening marriage (ḥalāla). 86 The Qur'ān 4:34 states, 'Men are protectors and maintainers of women because Allah has made one of them excel over the other, and because they spend out of their possessions (to support them).' 87 Munshi Buzul-ul-Raheem v Luteefutoon-Nissa (1861) 8 MIA 397.
India even today where it has not been overruled, however, the situation in Pakistan and Bangladesh is different. Gangrade argues that in India, it is uncertain whether a wife can ask for khul' against the wishes of the husband. 88 In Umar Bibi v Mohammad Din, 89 a Divisional Bench of the Lahore High Court rejected appeals by two women who were seeking divorce on the basis of khul' against the consents of their husbands and on the basis of incompatibility of temperament as grounds for their divorces. This view was upheld by a full bench of the same Court in Sayeeda Khanam v Muhammad Sami 90 in 1952. The questions before the Court were: 1) whether incompatibility of temperament constitutes a ground for divorce under Islamic law; and 2) whether discord (shiqāq) constitutes a ground for divorce under Islamic law. The Court answered both the questions in the negative. The Court held that the crucial role of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in the Jamīla episode discussed above, was that even the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not take it upon himself to dissolve the marriage; he had only ordered the husband to do so and the Prophet's role in this case was not that of a judge at all, but of a law-giver. 91 As explained above, the Court merely endorsed the traditional view of the Ḥanafī jurists. Justice Kaikaus argued that the 'you' in the phrase 'if you fear' [khiftum] must be addressed to the state and the judicial officers of the state but it clearly was not addressed to the spouse. In his view, a reference to the judge could possibly arise in circumstances where the wife wanted a divorce but the husband had refused his assent. Thus, it was for the judge to determine whether the parties would keep within the limits of Allah if the marriage were to continue. There is no point in referring the matter to a judge and in requiring him to make a determination if, in the end, he is powerless to do anything should he be convinced that the spouses could not remain within the bounds set by God. The Court concluded that the reference to the judge under the verse can only mean that he is entitled to pass an order dissolving the marriage even though the husband is not ready to divorce.
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In its understanding of verse 2:229, the Court deviated from the interpretation of this verse by Muslim exegetes discussed above. In this case the judges themselves interpreted verse 2:229 by directly relying on the Qur'ān itself and aḥādīth of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and by ignoring the opinions of the classical and the medieval jurists. In addition, the Court considered khul' as ṭalāq (divorce) rather than fasakh (dissolution of marriage). Thus, in the Court's view in khul', the wife has to redeem herself in return for some consideration and a Court can dissolve the same if it was convinced that the spouses would not be able to live within the bounds set by God, and that the consent of the husband for the validity of khul', in such cases, was not necessary. The Court also argued that in the Jamīla's case discussed above the dissolution was directly ordered by the Prophet (peace be upon him) acting as a judge (rather than as a social or a political leader, as viewed by some authors), without commenting on the reasonableness of the attitude of the wife, and without seeking the consent of the husband. 95 The Court relied upon the opinion of Maulānā Mawdūdī, who has deviated from the opinions of the majority of fuqahā' and has explicitly given the opinion:
[A] Wife's right to khul' is parallel to the man's right of talāq. Like the latter the former too is unconditional. It is indeed a mockery of the Shariat that we regard khul' as something depending either on the consent of the husband or on the verdict of the qazi. The law of Islam 94 Ibid, 573. The Court relied on Syed Abū al 'Alā Mawdūdī's Huqooq-uz-Zawjain for its interpretation of the verse. Carroll argues that, 'It is extremely unusual for the opinions of a living person not examined in the Court to be cited in a judicial decision.' Carroll, '"Qur'ān 2:229" A Charter Granted to the Wife? Judicial Khul' in Pakistan" ' (1996) 98 Commenting on verse 2:229, the Court gave its own interpretation while ignoring the opinions of the exegetes, and held:
[W]here the husband disputes the right of the wife to obtain separation by khula [khul'], it is obvious that some third party will have to decide the matter and, consequently, the dispute will have to be adjudicated upon by the Qazi, with or without assistance of the Hakams. Any other interpretation of the Qur'ānic verse regarding khula [khul'] would deprive it of all efficacy as a charter granted to the wife. It is significant that according to the Qur'ān she can "ransom herself" or "get her release" and it is plain that these words connote an independent right in her. 99 However, the Supreme Court put some limits on the wife's right to obtain khul'. The Court opined, '[T]he Qur'ānic condition must be satisfied that it is no longer possible for the husband and the wife to live together in harmony and in conformity with their obligations.' 100 The Lahore High Court in Balqis Fatima case had already observed:
There is an important limitation on her right of khul'. It is only if the judge apprehends that the limits of God will not be observed, that is, in their relation towards one another, the spouses will not obey God, that a harmonious married state, as envisaged by Islam, will not be possible that he will grant a dissolution. The wife cannot have a divorce for every passing impulse. Carroll argues that the 'apprehension' or 'satisfaction' of the judge is 'essentially a subjective evaluation.' 102 It has to be supported by some material evidence. Justice Javed Iqbal of the Lahore High Court, tried to clarify the law for the lower courts, when he observed:
If the Judge Family Court arrives at the conclusion that no reconciliation was possible, that the wife was determined to get the marriage dissolved, and that not dissolving the marriage would amount to forcing or compelling her to live in a hateful union with the husband, then he must dissolve the marriage on the basis of khula [khul']. The opinions of Jurists and Commentators stand on no higher footing than that of reasoning of men falling in the category of secondary sources of Muslim law, and cannot, therefore, compare in weight or authority with, nor alter the Qur'ānic law or the Aḥādīth. If the opinions of the jurists conflict with the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, they are not binding on Courts, and it is our duty, as true Muslims, to obey the word of God and the Holy Prophet (ati-ullah-waati-ur-Rasool). With great regard and utmost respect for the scholarship, 'Taqwa' and deep insight of the eminent Aimma Ezam and Ulema kiram this Court cannot declare any law or provision of law merely on the basis of views, verdicts and Fatawa issued by the honourable scholars whosoever they might be. 108 The Court held that '[t]he impugned provision of law [i.e., S. 10(4)] was not found to be in conflict with any specific injunction contained in the Holy Qur'ān and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him husband does not at all agree to the divorce of his wife and all the reconciliatory efforts fail.
110
After discussing the various arguments, verses of the Qur'ān, aḥādith, and opinions of jurisprudents, the Court came to the conclusion that 'there is no specific verse or authentic Aḥadith that provides a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by a competent Qazi to decree the case of Khula agitated before him by a wife after reconciliation fail.' 111 This was indeed a very bold decision and must be appreciated.
Under the above section, i.e., 10(4), obtaining khul' has become easier for women, but the problem is that khul' is availed as an alternative remedy. Usually, a complainant woman requests dissolution of her marriage on the basis of cruelty of her husband or in-laws or non-maintenance by her husband or any other remedy under the DMMA 1939, and requests khul' only as an alternative remedy. It is very unfortunate that in some cases, the judges only grant khul' and ignore all other remedies and order the wife to return her dower to the husband. 112 However, there are many cases in which the courts have corrected these aberrations and laid down the true exposition of the law of khul'.
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The Superior Courts in Pakistan have not considered themselves bound by taqlīd and, by seemingly resorting to ijtihād, 114 have asserted three rights: first, their right to independent interpretation of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, where necessary; second, their right to differ from the doctrines of traditionally authoritative legal 110 While interpreting and explaining the Shari'ah the recognized principles of interpretation and explanation of the Holy Qur'ān and Sunnah shall be followed and the expositions and opinions of recognized jurists of Islam belonging to prevalent Islamic schools of jurisprudence may be taken into consideration. 119 It is noteworthy that the words 'may be taken into consideration' in section 2, are recommendatory only and not mandatory. Moreover, it is unclear what is meant by the word 'prevalent'; it apparently allows the judges to resort to takhayur or choosing the opinion of one school over that of the other(s), and not to strictly adhere to the interpretation of only one school of thought. 115 There are two important decisions on this point and both relate to the custody of children. ān or an authentic ḥadīth of the Prophet (may peace be upon him), then undoubtedly the latter shall prevail and it is the bounden duty of the Courts to ascertain the correct rule of decision in all the matters enumerated above.' At 567 (per Muhammad Yaqub Ali, J). 117 Literally favoring or choosing a position from one of the schools to the practical exclusion of the other three schools, as was done in 1939 when the DMMA was legislated where the Mālikī doctrines for dissolution of marriage were adopted so that a Muslim woman could get her marriage dissolved on the basis of various grounds. 118 Literally 'patchwork', it is combining or mixing the positions of two or more schools to produce a hybrid ruling which does not belong, exclusively, to any of them. 119 See section 2 of Shari‛ah Enforcement Act 1991 (Act X of 1991).
Rashida Begum v Shahab Din
A closer look, however, reveals that in the case of khul', the Courts in Pakistan did not resort to ijtihād per se but rather applied the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in preference to the interpretations of Muslim jurists. In other words, the Courts deviated from the opinions of the majority of Muslim jurists only thinking that these opinions were not based on the Qur'ān and more specifically, the Sunnah of the Prophet. Since the topic of ijtihād and the modes of ijtihād are complex, any statement to the effect that the Pakistani Courts resorted to ijtihād regarding khul' would be a sweeping one.
120 Balqis Fatima and Khurshid Bibi are indeed very bold decisions, but these have deviated from the settled opinions of the majority of fuqahā' of Ḥanafī, Shāfi'ī and Ḥanbalī schools as well as the Shī'a school of thought. Moreover, in both cases, the judges have given the opinions of some scholars to support the view that the consent of the husband is not required in khul', but the Courts needed to mention the vast literature within the Mālikī school to support its stance. This is why the 'ulamā in Pakistan have managed to level a scathing attack on the precedent repeatedly upheld by the Superior Courts regarding khul'. . This is the most critical attack on any decision of the Supreme Court by a man of very high caliber, who himself served as judge of the Shariat Appellate Bench, Supreme Court for about two decades. 'Uthmānī argues that the Prophet (peace be upon him) was acting as a muṣliḥ (conciliator) and was giving only his advice; that he was not acting as a judge; that he was a political and social leader and people used to bring to him their social problems and so on. These arguments cannot be accepted, however, because if we agree that the Prophet was acting as a muṣliḥ in the case of Jamīla/Ḥabība, then it can be said that in all other civil cases brought to him he was acting as a muṣliḥ and not as a qāḍī (judge). This would mean that in all those the Prophet gave only his non-binding opinion. This is a thesis of dangerous proportion. A full rebuttal of 'Uthmānī's thesis is beyond the scope of this article. The Council of Islamic Ideology makes recommendations to the Parliament, Provincial Assemblies, the President, or any Governor, on whether a proposed law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. 123 The Council's duties are only of an advisory and recommendatory nature. The Council has no independent power of enforcement. Articles 227-231 of the Constitution of Pakistan only established a process by which the Council may have advisory input on the 'Islamic' credentials of existing and proposed laws. 124 The Council made its recommendation regarding khul' to the Government of Pakistan, which is reproduced below: Therefore, in our opinion, a law should be enacted at the level of the state that, after a woman's written request for divorce, the husband must have an obligation to divorce her within 90 days. If the husband refuses to divorce her, the marriage shall stand dissolved after the passage of this time [90 days] except if the wife revokes her request. The husband should have no right to revoke after this. The wife must return assets and property given to her by the husband except dower and maintenance if demanded by the husband or else approach a court of law for the resolution of the conflict (of return of assets/valuables). 125 There are several points to note. First, the Council's Recommendation seems to be a deviation from the apparent words of verse 2:229 of the Qur'ān, 126 according to which the wife pays something to free herself. Second, the Recommendation also seems to deviate from the precedent laid down by the Prophet in the Ḥabība's case, discussed above, in which she was asked by the Prophet to return her dower to her husband in return for her freedom from marriage. Third, the Recommendation is in accord with Islamic law, especially the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, in cases when the husband is the cause of discord. Finally, the Recommendation overlaps with section 10(4) of the West Pakistan Family Court Act 1964 as amended in 2002, which governs the existing law on khul'. However, the view of the Council seems to change with the change of its Chairman. On 27 May 2015, Mawlana Muhammad Khan Shirani, Chairman CII, opined that 'courts should refrain from dissolving 'nikāḥ' (marriage contract) in the name of 'khula' or separation.' He argued that '[k]hula is an agreement between two parties and it should not be granted until the husband agrees to it.' 127 Mawlana Shirani wishes to impose the views of the Ḥanafī school on Pakistani society, forgetting that the Council has to render advise according to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him) only.
Conclusion
The main argument of the article may be reiterated here. The jamhoor (majority) of schools of thought argue that khul' is consensual between the husband and the wife. In their view, a judge cannot dissolve a marriage by khul' on the request of the wife without the consent of the husband. On the other hand, Mālikī jurists argue that the decree of the arbitrators is valid whether they order separation or union between the two, and it neither requires the consent of the husband nor of the wife. 
